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The Euro and Fiscal Policy
Antonio Fatás and Ilian Mihov
8.1    Introduction
The creation of a single currency in Europe has been accompanied by 
some major changes in the institutional setting for ﬁ  scal policy. In this chap-
ter we ask whether the new institutional framework has led to a change in 
the conduct of ﬁ  scal policy in the members of the euro area. The run-  up 
to the launch of the euro was already diﬃcult and driven by the strict cri-
teria deﬁ  ned by the Maastricht treaty. Because this was a process driven by 
entry requirements, limited attention was paid to the long-  run optimality 
of these conditions. With the introduction of the euro in January 1999 the 
issues became broader and moved from a matter of debate in the academic 
profession to a real-  time challenge for policymakers. Within the ﬁ  rst years 
of the European Monetary Union (EMU), the framework for ﬁ  scal policy 
embedded in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has been subjected to 
many criticisms and has certainly failed to provide a credible framework for 
the conduct of ﬁ  scal policy. Although the pact was intended to be conducive 
to an environment of discipline, coordination, and stability, its constraints 
became binding for several countries and presented challenges to macro-
economic stability and to the credibility of the pact at the very early years 
of the EMU.
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We review the behavior of ﬁ  scal policy after the introduction of the euro 
in several dimensions: procyclicality, volatility, coordination, and the role 
of automatic stabilizers. We characterize how the common currency and 
the constraints associated with the Stability and Growth Pact have shaped 
ﬁ  scal policy among the members of the union. The focus of the chapter is 
not so much in providing yet another discussion on the merits and the faults 
of the Stability and Growth Pact and how it could be reformed. We are 
after characterizing the behavior of ﬁ  scal policy and understanding whether, 
from the perspective of the euro and monetary policy, there should be any 
strong concerns about this behavior. Is the European Central Bank (ECB) 
being hurt by the behavior of ﬁ  scal policy? Does monetary policy have to 
compensate for the poor behavior of ﬁ  scal policy? In that sense, we see our 
analysis as taking place at the aggregate level more than at the national level. 
Nevertheless, given that there are no ﬁ  scal policy decisions taking place at 
the level of the monetary union, we also report results related to the behavior 
of ﬁ  scal policy at the national level.
Our results show that despite the signiﬁ  cant change in the institutional 
setting, the cyclical behavior of ﬁ  scal policy in the euro area is mildly pro-
cyclical and has not changed much since the introduction of the new cur-
rency. In contrast, U.S. ﬁ  scal policy has become distinctly countercycli-
cal over the period 1999 to 2007. We also document that there has been 
a broad-  based decline in the volatility of discretionary ﬁ  scal policy in all 
major economies. This decline is quite substantial for the euro area and is 
present in the majority of the member states. Furthermore, the discrepancy 
of ﬁ  scal policy across euro area countries—measured by the dispersion of 
cyclically-  adjusted balances—has decreased threefold since 1999.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section (8.2) we provide 
an assessment of the debates around ﬁ  scal policy as well as an overview of 
the academic literature. In section 8.3 we characterize the behavior of ﬁ  scal 
policy at the euro level and we compare it to policy dynamics in the United 
States and other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) economies. Section 8.4 asks the question whether the correct cycli-
cal measure is the output gap or output growth. In section 8.5 we discuss 
coordination of ﬁ  scal policies, and section 8.6 concludes.
8.2      The Debates on Fiscal Policy
The ﬁ  scal framework of the Maastricht treaty and the introduction of the 
euro generated a renewed interest in ﬁ  scal policy and in the design of in-
stitutions that promote good policies. The ﬁ  rst problem in the analysis of 
the recent experience in the euro area comes from the observation that it is 
diﬃcult to reach a consensus on what constitutes good ﬁ  scal policy and what 
should be the appropriate policy stance, given economic conditions. Our 
approach is to focus on a set of particular behaviors of ﬁ  scal policy that have The Euro and Fiscal Policy    2 8 9
been analyzed previously in the literature and that can be linked potentially 
to a broad set of theoretical frameworks that study biases in ﬁ  scal policy.
We characterize the performance of ﬁ  scal policy authorities and the envi-
ronment in which they operate along three main dimensions: (a) Long- term 
sustainability of ﬁ  scal policy; (b) the behavior of ﬁ  scal policy over the busi-
ness cycle; (c) volatility (i.e., changes in ﬁ  scal policy that are exogenous to 
the cycle). Implicitly, we assume that good ﬁ  scal policy must be sustainable, 
possibly countercyclical (but also could be acyclical), and it should not be a 
signiﬁ  cant source of volatility.
We start with an overview of the debates on these topics and a brief review 
of the academic literature. We also oﬀer a short discussion of the rules and 
institutions designed to constrain ﬁ  scal policy discretion. The analysis is 
framed in the context of EMU. In the next section we empirically character-
ize each of the ﬁ  scal policy behaviors we describe here.
8.2.1      Sustainability of Fiscal Policy
Long-  term sustainability is central to the institutional setting of ﬁ  scal 
policy in EMU and one of the biggest concerns of both policymakers and 
academics. For emerging markets, conﬁ  dence in the sustainability of govern-
ment budgets has direct eﬀects on interest rates and economic performance. 
Many of the deepest crises in these countries have been characterized by 
large increases in the risk premium or defaults on government debt.
In developed countries, the concerns started with the increase in govern-
ment debt levels in the mid-  1970s, and while these levels have stabilized or 
have even gone down in recent years, the uncertainty of the consequences 
of future demographic changes has kept the debate alive.
The diﬃculty of governments to produce sustainable budgetary plans 
became known in the academic literature as the deﬁ  cit bias of governments 
(Persson and Svensson 1989; Alesina and Tabellini 1990). This deﬁ  cit could 
be due to the common pool problem or the strategic behavior of politicians 
in power as they tie the hands of the new elected governments or it could be 
simply a sign of short- sightedness of policies (for a survey of the theoretical 
literature see Persson and Tabellini [2001]).
In the EMU context, the Maastricht treaty identiﬁ  es sustainability as the 
most important bias to deal with in the context of a single-  currency area. 
What is the economic rationale for such a concern in a monetary union? 
Unsustainable ﬁ  scal policy may generate excessive macroeconomic vola-
tility, which in turn will complicate the goal of the central bank in main-
taining stability within the EMU. The potential tension between ﬁ  scal and 
monetary authorities is present in any economy, but these tensions might 
be more relevant for a monetary union where ﬁ  scal policy is decentralized 
and coordination might be more diﬃcult or simply not in the interest of 
national governments.
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where the “sustainability of public ﬁ  nances” is seen as the main goal of the 
ﬁ  scal framework. And the logic is that “sound ﬁ  scal policies and a mon-
etary policy geared to price stability are fundamental for the success of a 
Monetary Union. They are prerequisites for macroeconomic stability and 
cohesion in the euro area” (Statement of the Governing Council of the ECB, 
March 21, 2005).
Under extreme circumstances, unsustainable ﬁ  scal policy plans can lead 
to a deterioration of credibility and the expectation that monetary policy 
will bail out governments by creating unexpected inﬂ  ation. In the context of 
a shared currency it can be that this bias becomes stronger as governments 
do not internalize the consequences of their behavior on the credibility of 
the common currency. This could create externalities in terms of credibil-
ity or simply through interest rate channels. Although this is a possibility, 
the academic literature does not reach a consensus either on whether these 
externalities matter or on their size.
While sustainability relates to the long-  term behavior of ﬁ  scal policy, it 
is connected in many ways to the discussions around business cycle stabi-
lization policies. The lack of discipline in ﬁ  scal policy can make the mac-
roeconomic management of the economy diﬃcult. First, from a dynamic 
point of view, if governments face debt levels that are unsustainable, they 
will have very little room to use automatic stabilizers in bad times so all 
the pressure will fall on monetary policy to smooth the business cycle. As 
such, a combination of high deﬁ  cits and procyclical ﬁ  scal stance ampliﬁ  es 
economic ﬂ  uctuations because it reduces the eﬀectiveness of automatic sta-
bilizers (as argued by Melitz [2000] and Perry [2003]). Second, unsustainable 
plans will have to turn into sustainable ones by ﬁ  scal consolidations that are 
likely to have a short-  term eﬀect on the economy. Finally, high debt levels 
lead to higher interest rate and lower investment and growth (Mankiw and 
Elmendorf [1999] provide a survey of the empirical literature). Of course, 
a deterioration of macroeconomic performance might not have a direct 
impact on the conduct of monetary policy but there is, however, the argu-
ment that favorable macroeconomic conditions can make the running of 
monetary policy easier from a political point of view. For example, in the 
presence of inﬂ  ationary pressures, ﬁ  scal prudence will reduce the need to 
increase interest rates.
There is yet another connection between sustainability and the cyclical 
stance of ﬁ  scal policy; one that is related to the design and implementation 
of budgetary plans. When it comes to the discussions on what constitutes 
a sustainable ﬁ  scal policy, there is the need to measure, characterize, and 
monitor annual budgets. Because of the short-  term ﬂ  uctuations in budgets 
due to automatic stabilizers, there is the need to capture the structural bal-
ance in a given year; that is, the budget balance adjusted for cyclical changes. 
Without a proper understanding of how ﬁ  scal policy behaves over the busi-
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This has been one of the major diﬃculties of the implementation of the 
limits on deﬁ  cits and debt of the Maastricht treaty. While they were based 
on simple principles of sustainability, there were endless discussions on the 
special circumstances that had led to balances that did not corresponded 
with the projected levels. The 2005 reform of the Stability and Growth Pact 
allowed for a more ﬂ  exible interpretation of the limits that takes into account 
the cyclical position of the economy. There is, however, no consensus on how 
this adjustment needs to be made and some see this ﬂ  exibility as a relaxation 
of the constraints.
In summary, although the main concern of the EMU ﬁ  scal policy frame-
work was long- term sustainability, the implementation of the rules have led 
to debates that have focused much more on the cyclical behavior of ﬁ  scal 
policy. We now turn to this debate.
8.2.2      Fiscal Policy Stance and Management of Business Cycles
Although there is a large body of theoretical literature on ﬁ  scal policy, it 
is diﬃcult to provide an easy characterization of what the appropriate behav-
ior of ﬁ  scal policy over the business cycle should be. A starting framework 
could be one of tax smoothing, as in Barro (1979). Within that framework 
we can ﬁ  nd a pattern of cyclical ﬂ  uctuations of the budget as distortion-
ary taxes are kept constant and the balance has to absorb changes in other 
revenues or expenditures or changes in taxes that follow the stochastic prop-
erties of the cyclical shocks (as in Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe [1994]). 
Within the context of Keynesian models, and under the assumption that 
consumers are liquidity-  constrained, it is expected that governments run 
deﬁ  cits during bad times and surpluses during good times, as this policy will 
help to stabilize the economy.
From the perspective of monetary policy, high deﬁ  cits can lead to inﬂ  a-
tionary pressures and might force the ECB to keep interest rates higher than 
what they otherwise would be. Of course, it has to be that these high deﬁ  cits 
take place at a time when they are not needed, which leads to the discussion 
on what is the appropriate stance of ﬁ  scal policy during the cycle. This is 
relevant for economies where ﬁ  scal and monetary policies are decided at 
the same level but it might become more acute when we have a scenario of 
a monetary union. The decentralized nature of national budgets can make 
the coordination of policies more diﬃcult.
Beyond the theoretical discussions, the issue of the cyclicality of ﬁ  scal 
policy has received much attention in the empirical literature. There is strong 
evidence that ﬁ  scal policy tends to be less countercyclical than what nor-
mative models suggest. In fact, in many cases, ﬁ  scal policy is procyclical, 
which will exacerbate the business cycle and makes the conduct of monetary 
policy more diﬃcult. Theories explaining this behavior point to increases 
in spending in good times that exceed the increase in tax revenues. Most 
Latin American economies, for example, display procyclical ﬁ  scal policy 292        Antonio Fatás and Ilian Mihov
as documented in Gavin and Perotti (1997) and explained in terms of the 
voracity eﬀect in Tornell and Lane (1999). The evidence for OECD and 
European economies is somewhat mixed. There is some evidence of pro-
cyclical behavior, but in most cases, policy is either acyclical or only slightly 
countercyclical. Lane (2003) and Wyplosz (2005) present evidence on the 
cyclical properties of ﬁ  scal policy for this group of countries. More re-
cent studies corroborate these results (e.g., Kaminsky, Reinhardt, and Vegh 
2004). Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini (2007) also discuss similar evidence 
and present alternative political economy theories of this behavior.
When analyzing the cyclical behavior of ﬁ  scal policy it is important to 
understand that ﬁ  scal policy is a combination of automatic stabilizers and 
discretionary policy. Many of the aforementioned papers deal with discre-
tionary changes but we cannot forget that for most countries the majority of 
cyclical changes in budgets are a result of automatic stabilizers.
The role of automatic stabilizers is one that has received little attention in 
the literature. In the case of EMU, the assumption is that they are inﬂ  uenced 
by tax codes and spending rules that have not been aﬀected by the limits on 
deﬁ  cits and debt. Many studies about automatic stabilizers take a public 
ﬁ  nance perspective and attempt to measure the elasticity of diﬀerent ﬁ  scal 
components to the cycle. For example, Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) study 
the size of the automatic stabilizers in the United States to conclude that 
they have been quite stable despite changes in tax rates.
From a macroeconomic point of view, the eﬀects of automatic stabilizers 
have been linked to the size of governments. The reason for this link is the 
empirical regularity presented in Galí (1994) and conﬁ  rmed in Fatás and 
Mihov (2001), that large governments display less volatile business cycles. 
The logic is that the size of the governments is related to the safety network 
provided by governments. There is some evidence that this robust empiri-
cal regularity has gotten weaker in recent years as some governments have 
reduced their size, which has not resulted in a more volatile economy (see 
Debrun, Pisany-  Ferry, and Sapir 2008). One potential explanation for the 
weakening of the link between government size and volatility is that recent 
declines in government size have happened in components that are incon-
sequential for macroeconomic volatility. The reduced-  form nature of the 
empirical analysis does not provide a deeper insight into the sources of the 
reduced role of government size for macroeconomic stability.
8.2.3    Volatility
Fiscal policy can be a source of business cycles. When governments imple-
ment changes in ﬁ  scal policy for political reasons or, more generally, for 
reasons that are not driven by economic conditions, then these changes will 
lead to ﬂ  uctuations in output and consumption. In principle, such policies 
may have a negative eﬀect on the economy if they simply add volatility, 
which in some cases may slow down growth. The eﬀects of ﬁ  scal policy The Euro and Fiscal Policy    2 9 3
shocks has received much attention after the work of Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002), Fatás and Mihov (2001), and Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher 
(2004). The origin of these changes has been associated to the political busi-
ness cycle. While the evidence is mixed, there is some recent support for 
the presence of an electoral cycle among some economies (Drazen 2000). 
The macroeconomic consequences of volatility in ﬁ  scal policy as well as its 
institutional origin has been documented in Fatás and Mihov (2003, 2007), 
where the aggressive use of discretion in ﬁ  scal policy has been shown to 
generate macroeconomic volatility and lower growth.
The issue of volatility has not been a major concern in the EMU context, 
but we will still study it empirically to see if there is any evidence of changes 
in the use of discretionary ﬁ  scal policy. It is possible that the absence of na-
tional currencies has changed the incentives of governments to engage in 
policies that lead to a political business cycle.
8.2.4      Rules, Institutions, and Fiscal Policy in the Context of EMU
The 1992 Maastricht treaty recognized the importance of providing a 
framework for ﬁ  scal policy in EMU and established limits to deﬁ  cits and 
debt in order to “avoid excessive government deﬁ  cits” (Article 104c). At the 
same time it deﬁ  ned an Excessive Deﬁ  cit Procedure in case of violations. The 
main goal of this ﬁ  scal framework was to ensure the sustainability of public 
ﬁ  nances among members of the European Monetary Union and provide 
the necessary credibility to the currency. The implementation of this prin-
ciple was done through a ceiling on deﬁ  cits and debt as percentage of gross 
domestic product (GDP). These ceilings were deﬁ  ned independently of the 
business cycle, although there could be exceptional circumstances under 
which a country could go above those limits.
The Stability and Growth Pact (1997) developed the original ideas of 
the Maastricht treaty into a set of more detailed rules and processes to 
ensure budget discipline and enforcement. With the Stability and Growth 
Pact there is a slight change in the focus and motivation of the framework. 
From the narrow goal of ensuring sustainability of the Maastricht treaty, 
there is a broader need to “strengthen the surveillance of budgetary posi-
tions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies.” From a 
process point of view, the Pact included the creation of an early-  warning 
mechanism through the preventive arm and emphasis on medium- term bud-
getary plans.
As a condition for entry in the single currency area, the limits on deﬁ  cits 
and debt had a large impact on ﬁ  scal positions. The run-  up to EMU saw 
a large decline in budget deﬁ  cits among all candidates. Once EMU started 
there was a clear sign of ﬁ  scal fatigue that, combined with the slowdown of 
2002, led to several countries being above the agreed ceilings. While growth 
rates were low in those years, they were not low enough to qualify as a “severe 
economic downturn.” As countries breached the limits on budget deﬁ  cits it 294        Antonio Fatás and Ilian Mihov
became clear that the enforcement mechanisms of the SGP were not cred-
ible. This opened a broad debate on the merits of the current system among 
policymakers and academics. It is diﬃcult to provide an exhaustive review 
of this literature but Buti and Sapir (2002), Galí and Perotti (2003), Fatás et 
al. (2003), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004), Brunila, Buti, and Franco (2001), 
and Buiter and Grafe (2002) provide a review of the early years as well 
as proposals to modify the stability and growth pact. More recent reviews 
include von Hagen (2005) and Wyplosz (2005).1 This debate led to a proposal 
to amend the principles of the Stability and Growth put forward by a report 
of the Economic and Financial Aﬀairs Council (ECOFIN) in March 2005, 
which was later endorsed by the European Council.
The modiﬁ  cations introduced in 2005 allowed for more ﬂ  exible interpreta-
tions of the limits on deﬁ  cits, including adjustments for cyclical conditions. 
These changes were criticized by many, including the ECB, as an attempt 
to relax the constraints that governments faced and a failure to address 
the real problems with the current ﬁ  scal policy framework. The fact that 
the European economies witnessed healthy growth rates in the years that 
followed eased the tensions imposed by the limits on deﬁ  cits. What remains 
unclear is how the new rules, which provide much more room for the inter-
pretation of what constitutes an excessive deﬁ  cit, will work in the years to 
come as the euro economies enter a recessionary environment and deﬁ  cits 
are likely to be above the established ceiling. It is likely that we will return to 
the debate about the trade- oﬀ that exists between simple rules that might be 
seen as inappropriate or short-  sighted, and the necessary ﬂ  exibility to deal 
with idiosyncratic conditions in each country. The evolution of the Stability 
and Growth Pact has been toward ﬂ  exibility, which has been welcomed by 
governments, but there are well-  founded concerns that the added ﬂ  exibility 
has relaxed the constraints of the system to a point that they have become 
irrelevant. This is very much linked to the academic debate about rules versus 
institutions. Even if we accept that there is a need to restrict governments 
and ﬁ  scal policy, are numerical rules the right way to do so or can we design 
a set of budget processes and institutions that can ensure the proper behavior 
of ﬁ  scal policy by using (good) judgment? Wyplosz (2005) and Fatás et al. 
(2003) argue that establishing checks on the budgetary process through in-
dependent committees might generate a superior outcome relative to simple 
numerical rules.
8.3      Fiscal Policy in the Euro Area
To start the empirical assessment of ﬁ  scal policy, we ﬁ  rst take the perspec-
tive of the ECB as it tries to manage the economic conditions of the euro 
1. This debate is also linked to the earlier academic literature on the eﬀects of budget- balance 
constraints of U.S. states (Alt and Lowry 1994; Poterba 1994; von Hagen 1992; Alesina and 
Bayoumi 1996). There is also a broader literature on the connection between budgetary pro-
cesses and ﬁ  scal outcomes (Poterba and von Hagen 1999).The Euro and Fiscal Policy    2 9 5
area and has to deal with the euro area ﬁ  scal policy stance. This euro ﬁ  scal 
policy stance is the result of a collection of decentralized national ﬁ  scal 
policies. Each of these policies is decided independently and they react to 
national economic conditions but this is, in principle, irrelevant to the con-
duct of monetary policy that is only concerned with the aggregate of the 
euro countries. For this reason we also look at data at the level of individual 
countries.
When we look at ﬁ  scal policy at the national level, we are interested in the 
same characterization of ﬁ  scal policy, but the issues that arise are slightly 
diﬀerent. National governments are worried that in the absence of monetary 
policy they need to be more aggressive in the use of ﬁ  scal policy as a way 
to smooth the business cycle. This is even more relevant in the European 
context where mobility of labor is very limited. Has this happened? Or have 
the constraints on deﬁ  cits and debt limited the ﬂ  exibility available to ﬁ  scal 
policy?
A second source of costs for national economies could be associated to 
interest rate eﬀects of ﬁ  scal policies in other countries. As all countries share 
a common currency, there could be a spillover from deﬁ  cits in the other 
members of EMU via the interest rate (or the premium associated to the 
euro currency, if it had an eﬀect on the credibility of the ECB). This raises 
the issue of coordination and the extent to which national ﬁ  scal policies 
take into account what is happening in other countries or at the European 
level.
8.3.1      Sustainability of Fiscal Policy
Figure 8.1 shows the evolution of the debt to output ratio for the euro 
area, the United Kingdom, and the United States.2 The evolution of this 
ratio for the euro countries shows an increasing trend until the mid-  1990s. 
There is a clear downward trend that starts at this point. This trend was also 
followed by the United States and the United Kingdom until 2001 to 2002. 
The trend in the euro area has been interpreted before as a clear sign of the 
discipline that the entry conditions imposed on all members.3
Figure 8.2 provides more insights on these trends by looking at structural 
budget balances, which are measured as the cyclically adjusted balance as a 
percentage to potential output (using the OECD methodology). The decade 
of the 1970s as well as late 1980s and early 1990s showed high deﬁ  cits for 
all countries in the sample. By the early 1990s there was a growing need 
to tackle these deﬁ  cits as levels of government debt increased in several 
2. Figure 8.1 reports gross government debt. It might be more appropriate to look at net 
liabilities, which in the case of the United States stand at about 44 percent of GDP, while in 
Europe they are closer to 47 percent. However, although the levels are diﬀerent, the dynamics 
of the net and gross liabilities for the three countries in the ﬁ  gure are very similar.
3. Of course, one can construct explicit measures of sustainability by calculating the required 
tax rate, which ensures that public debt does not explode (given assumptions on future interest 
rates and output growth). Blanchard (1993) reviews some of the proposals for such “indicators 
of sustainability.”Fig. 8.1    Gross government debt (percentage of GDP)
Notes: Data are from the OECD Economic Outlook. The series for the UK are gross govern-
ment ﬁ  nancial liabilities as a percentage of GDP. For the euro area the series are gross govern-
ment ﬁ  nancial liabilities (Maastricht deﬁ  nition) as percentage of GDP. Data for 2008 and 
2009 are forecasts.
Figure 8.2  Cyclically-  adjusted budget balance as a percentage of potential output
Notes: Data are from the OECD Economic Outlook. Data for 2008 and 2009 are forecasts.The Euro and Fiscal Policy    2 9 7
  countries. This eﬀort started in the mid-  1990s, which coincides with the 
adoption of the Maastricht Treaty among European countries. Therefore, 
for EMU countries, the ﬁ  scal consolidation eﬀorts that were necessary 
because of the high debt levels were reinforced by the limits on budget deﬁ  -
cits and debt that were being created as a condition for entry into the single-
 currency  area.
During this period of ﬁ  scal consolidation all major economies, with the 
exception of Japan, behaved in a very similar way: structural budgets were 
brought up closer to balance or even to surplus. The improvement in the euro 
area budget balance is not as large as in the case of the United Kingdom and 
the United States but it is also true that the worsening of the balances as a 
result of the economic slowdown of 2001/  2003 is much more pronounced 
in the United States and the United Kingdom than in the euro area. For the 
euro countries, 1997 represents an inﬂ  exion point as the adjustment of struc-
tural deﬁ  cits clearly slows down right at the time when entry decisions for 
EMU are made. The euro structural balances improve again after 2003/ 2004, 
which coincides with a period of faster growth rates.
8.3.2      The Reaction of Fiscal Policy to Macroeconomic Conditions
To be able to interpret the stance of ﬁ  scal policy we need to separate the 
cyclical component from the structural one. Separating the cyclical from the 
structural component of ﬁ  scal policy is not an easy task and it is possibly 
one of the most controversial issues in the academic literature. Not only 
are there some practical issues related to estimating the cyclical behavior of 
ﬁ  scal policy, because of endogeneity, but there is also the broader debate on 
how to characterize the business cycle itself. Before we look at the data it is 
good to do a simple taxonomy of the diﬀerent concepts of ﬁ  scal policy we 
want to measure.
From a methodological point of view, we can think of ﬁ  scal policy as a 
combination of three elements:
1.  Automatic stabilizers: this is the reaction of ﬁ  scal policy to business 
cycles and it is a result of the tax code and spending rules that link budgetary 
components to changes in GDP.
2.  Endogenous discretionary ﬁ  scal policy: it includes changes in ﬁ  scal pol-
icy taken in response to changing economic conditions. These changes are 
discretionary in the sense that they are not coded in tax or spending laws.
3.  Exogenous discretionary ﬁ  scal policy: here we include changes in ﬁ  scal 
policy that are not related to economic conditions. They can be driven by 
political considerations (e.g., elections) or, in the case of European countries, 
by the conditions set by the Maastricht treaty.
From a conceptual point of view, it might be diﬃcult to separate these 
three components. For example, governments that are trying to implement 
a reduction in their debt levels (as it has been the case for most of these 
countries during recent years) might wait for a favorable economic envi-298        Antonio Fatás and Ilian Mihov
ronment to implement their adjustment policies. This could be seen as an 
endogenous change in ﬁ  scal policy but it is not directly motivated by the 
economic cycle.
From an econometric point of view, we can summarize the behavior of 
ﬁ  scal policy by using a ﬁ  scal policy rule such as
(1) Balt     Cyclet   Debtt1   Balt1  εt,
where “Bal” is a measure of ﬁ  scal policy, and “Cycle” is a variable that 
captures the state of the economy. “Debt” is gross government debt as per-
centage of GDP.4 The logic of this rule is that ﬁ  scal policy is a function of 
the level of debt (the parameter  can be seen as related to the indicators of 
sustainability) as well as a function of the current state of the cycle (captured 
by ). Any change in ﬁ  scal policy that is not directly related to the state of 
the economy or the level of debt will be part of the residual, which we will 
identify with exogenous discretionary ﬁ  scal policy.
There are two alternative approaches to estimating this policy rule: if 
ﬁ  scal policy is measured as the actual budget balance then the parameter 
 captures both the automatic stabilizers and the endogenous changes in 
discretionary ﬁ  scal policy. If instead we use a cyclically-  adjusted measure 
of the budget balance on the left- hand side, the parameter  is reﬂ  ecting the 
endogenous response of ﬁ  scal policy to the business cycle.
8.3.3      The Endogenous Response of Fiscal Policy to the Cycle
We start by looking at the behavior of cyclically-  adjusted balances as a 
measure of the discretionary response of governments to the business cycle. 
We use the structural balances constructed by the OECD. For details on 
this methodology see Girouard and Andre (2005). The drawback of this 
methodology is that it heavily relies on the process to extract the cyclical 
component out of ﬁ  scal policy that requires strong assumptions on potential 
output, cyclical elasticities of diﬀerent ﬁ  scal variables, and could potentially 
create a bias in the results. Blanchard (1993) and Mohr and Morris (2007) 
discuss the potential drawbacks of cyclically-  adjusted measures of ﬁ  scal 
policy.5
From an econometric point of view there could be a problem of endoge-
neity when it comes to the estimation of the aforementioned policy rule. To 
deal with this problem we use instrumental variables as previously proposed 
by Galí and Perotti (2003) and Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini (2007). 
There are cases where we discuss how the instrumental variables (IV) results 
4. The inclusion of debt in ﬁ  scal policy rules is advocated among others by Favero and 
Giavazzi (2007).
5. Generally speaking, the elasticities used to adjust the budget balance assume that the 
cyclical adjustment is happening mostly through revenues and not spending (see Girouard and 
André 2005). There is, however, evidence that spending also adjusts to the cycle in a counter-
cyclical manner (Melitz 2006).The Euro and Fiscal Policy    2 9 9
relate to the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates because we feel that the 
OLS estimates might provide a useful perspective. The instruments for the 
output gap are one lag of their own output gap as well as the current value 
of the U.S. output gap. For the United States we use the lag of own output 
gap as well as the lag of the output gap of the euro area.6
Table 8.1 presents the results. The top panel shows the estimates for the 
euro area as well as three large countries that we use as benchmarks of com-
parison. The reason for comparing the euro area to these three countries is 
that they are the largest three countries with similar level of GDP per capita 
and therefore the closest benchmark we can ﬁ  nd. The bottom panel shows 
the estimates for each of the individual EMU countries as well as seven addi-
tional economies, for the purpose of benchmarking. We present the results 
of estimating equation (1) both by instrumental variables and OLS.
We note ﬁ  rst that the coeﬃcient on debt in all cases is positive, as expected. 
Among the ﬁ  rst four countries, the largest coeﬃcient is in the United States, 
followed by the United Kingdom and the euro area. The coeﬃcient for Japan 
is several times lower than the coeﬃcients for other countries. It is hard 
to reach strong conclusions just from the size of this coeﬃcient but ﬁ  scal 
policy in the United States, United Kingdom, and in the euro area seem to 
be more responsive to concerns of sustainability.7 If we look at the results 
of the individual countries, the coeﬃcient on debt remains positive for all 
countries with the exception of New Zealand (when estimated by OLS). 
There are large variations in this coeﬃcient. If we ignore Luxembourg, that 
displays a very large coeﬃcient. We ﬁ  nd the largest coeﬃcients in Italy and 
outside of the euro area.
If we now look at the cyclical behavior of the balance (the coeﬃcient ), 
comparing the OLS and IV estimates reveal that, for many of the countries, 
OLS estimates for the parameter are lower than the instrumental variables 
ones. In principle, one might have expected the opposite. The OLS estimates 
are likely to be biased downwards because ﬁ  scal policy expansions (de-
crease in the budget balance) are likely to lead to increases in output. This 
reverse causality is likely to lower the OLS estimates of the cyclical elastic-
ity of ﬁ  scal policy (the parameter ), but our results point in the opposite 
direction.
If we focus on the top panel of the table, and regardless of the estima-
tion method, the euro area displays the most procyclical policy out of this 
group, in contrast with the United States, that shows acyclicality or mild 
6. Our instrumenting strategy assumes that the U.S. gap does not react contemporaneously 
to developments in other countries, while output in other countries is inﬂ  uenced by the U.S. 
output gap. Under this assumption current foreign gaps will be inappropriate instruments for 
the U.S. gap and therefore we use the lagged euro gap as an additional instrument for the U.S. 
reaction function.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.302        Antonio Fatás and Ilian Mihov
 counter- cyclicality. The U.K. results are closer to that of the euro area while 
Japan is closer to the United States. The procyclicality of the euro area 
is conﬁ  rmed when looking at the individual euro countries. The majority 
display negative coeﬃcients, some close to –  0.4 (Italy). In contrast, for the 
non- euro countries (and with the exception of Norway), the coeﬃcients are 
all positive and in some cases large (Sweden and New Zealand).
Another important insight from this table is that many of the coeﬃcients 
on the output gap are not signiﬁ  cant. This was also the case in Galí and 
Perotti (2003). In some sense, this could be expected given that the cyclically-
  adjusted balance has been constructed by purging the cyclical component 
from the budget balance. However, the method used is not simply an econo-
metric one but one that relies on information on elasticities of the diﬀerent 
ﬁ  scal components. So as long as governments engage often, and in the same 
direction, in ﬁ  scal policy decisions that are discretionary and related to the 
cycle, we should expect these coeﬃcients to be signiﬁ  cant. The fact that 
the coeﬃcients are not signiﬁ  cant could be an indication that this is not 
a behavior that we observe often. It could also be that the behavior is not 
consistent: maybe in some years ﬁ  scal policy behaved procyclically and in 
others countercyclically.
One of the questions that academics as well as policymakers are con-
cerned about is whether policy in the euro countries has changed as a result 
of the introduction of the euro. Here we need to be very careful as we will 
be looking at very short time series when we split the sample into two. There 
are two possible ways of splitting the sample: in 1992 when the Maastricht 
treaty was approved and governments started dealing with limits on budget 
deﬁ  cits, even if they were just entry conditions, and 1999 when the limits are 
actually enforced and there is a single monetary policy. We will show in the 
main text of the chapter the results where we split the sample in 1999 but we 
have also produced results splitting the sample in 1992 that are not included 
in this chapter but are available upon request.
Table 8.2 presents the results of estimating the policy rule in table 8.1 by 
allowing diﬀerent elasticities before and after 1999.8 Overall, there is a clear 
pattern of policies becoming more countercyclical after 1999. Among the 
top four large countries, the United States shows the largest change toward 
countercyclical policy.9 While in the ﬁ  rst sample policy looks mildly procy-
clical, it becomes very countercyclical after 1999. In the euro area there is 
practically no change in the coeﬃcient between the two periods.
If we look at the individual EMU countries, when comparing the pre-   
and post-  1999 samples we do not see any clear direction of change—in six 
countries policy has become less procyclical, while in the other six countries 
8. We only include in this table the IV results. The OLS estimates show a similar pattern.
9. For the United Kingdom the change is even more dramatic in the IV estimates, but the 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.304        Antonio Fatás and Ilian Mihov
policy has become more procyclical. Formal tests as indicated by p- values 
signal that there is no evidence of a statistically signiﬁ  cant shift in the cycli-
cality of ﬁ  scal policy in the euro area. Of all countries in the sample, we only 
ﬁ  nd two where there is a statistically signiﬁ  cant change in ﬁ  scal policy cycli-
cality. In the case of the United States, policy becomes more countercyclical; 
in the case of Denmark policy becomes more procyclical.
To some it might look like a surprise that the euro area ﬁ  scal stance is 
clearly procyclical given that we have seen in recent years an improvement 
in the budget balance during a period (post-  2003) where the economy dis-
played increasing growth rates. It might also look like these results contra-
dict those in other papers that show acyclical or even countercyclical ﬁ  scal 
policy for euro countries (e.g., Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini 2007). It 
is important to emphasize that the results in tables 8.1 and 8.2 are based 
on the cyclically-  adjusted budget balance, so we are ignoring automatic 
stabilizers.10 Our methodology is the one used by Galí and Perotti (2003). 
Their results are closer to ours, but still there is a diﬀerence when it comes 
to the euro area, where we are showing that ﬁ  scal policy is much more pro-
cyclical. Their estimates for the cyclicality of ﬁ  scal policy at the aggregate 
level are coming from estimating regression (1) for each of the countries 
and then aggregating the coeﬃcients across countries. We are looking at the 
whole euro area without taking into account individual behavior. In addi-
tion, our sample is longer and all these factors could explain the diﬀerences 
in results.
To understand better the strong procyclicality of ﬁ  scal policy of the euro 
area, we have plotted the change in the cyclically-  adjusted budget balance 
against the output gap for the years between 2000 and 2007. This is not 
exactly what is in our regression where we have the level of the balance on 
the left-  hand side but the coeﬃcient on the lagged value is high (although 
lower than one), plus it is quite common in the literature to look at changes 
in ﬁ  scal policy stance (see European Economy [2008] or Alesina, Campante, 
and Tabellini [2007]).
Figure 8.3 plots these two variables for the euro area and ﬁ  gure 8.4 does 
the same thing for the United States. The diﬀerence between the two plots 
is shocking. While for the United States there is a clear positive correla-
tion signaling strong countercyclical policy, for the euro area we see exactly 
the opposite, a strong negative correlation. The evolution of the euro ﬁ  scal 
stance is marked by decreasing balances after 2000, which reﬂ  ect the relax-
ation of ﬁ  scal policy after the launch of the euro, a sign of fatigue after the 
strong pre-  1998 decrease in deﬁ  cits to qualify for membership to EMU. 
After the recession of 2002/  2003 and despite the existence of a negative 
10. Table 8A.1 in the appendix shows the results of regressing the primary balance on the 
output gap. In that case, we observe acyclicality (if we use IV estimates) or even countercyclical-
ity (OLS) for the euro area, consistent with previous results in the literature.The Euro and Fiscal Policy    3 0 5
output gap, there is an improvement in the structural balance that again 
represents procyclical policy. This improvement is due to two reasons: ﬁ  rst, 
some of the euro countries were caught in levels of deﬁ  cit that were too close 
to 3 percent (or above 3 percent) and they had little room to adjust their ﬁ  scal 
policies. Second, and this is especially true in 2005, tax revenues increased 
faster than what many governments expected. One interpretation is that 
the tax elasticities were larger than normal. Some of this could be due to 
Fig. 8.3    Fiscal policy stance and the output gap: Euro area
Fig. 8.4    Fiscal policy stance and the output gap: United States306        Antonio Fatás and Ilian Mihov
composition eﬀects such as an increase in proﬁ  ts as a share of GDP during 
these years (see European Commission 2007). These increases in revenues 
and elasticities were assumed to be permanent by governments and led to 
increases in spending or decreases in taxes that in the years that followed 
(2006 and 2007) led to a structural balance that remained too low despite 
the improvement in the cyclical condition of the economy. This reading of 
the behavior of ﬁ  scal policy during these eight years reveals that some of 
it is due to special circumstances (such as the eﬀects of the launch of the 
new currency) but it is also diﬃcult to avoid a sense that the ﬁ  scal policy 
framework did not work as expected. While our sample ﬁ  nishes in 2007, as 
we are writing this chapter we are witnessing once again a recession, and 
one that is aﬀecting all advanced economies. While it is too early to reach 
conclusions about the extent to which ﬁ  scal policy will be used, so far the 
United States has shown once again a more aggressive response of ﬁ  scal 
policy to deteriorating economic conditions with projected deﬁ  cits for the 
years to come that are much larger than the ones we see in European coun-
tries. The diﬀerences in policy seem to be related more to diﬀerent views on 
the eﬀectiveness of ﬁ  scal policy (and the long-  term costs of implementing 
large ﬁ  scal policy stimulus) than to the limits imposed by the Stability and 
Growth Pact. Many European countries are planning deﬁ  cits in excess of 
the 3 percent limit and some of the non-  euro European countries that are 
not subject to this limit are also being more conservative than the United 
States (e.g., Sweden).
8.3.4      Digging Deeper: Spending and Taxes
To understand the source of changes in policy elasticities, we now look 
at the behavior of cyclically- adjusted spending and taxes. Tables 8.3 and 8.4 
replicate the results of table 8.2 but where the dependent variable is either the 
cyclically- adjusted spending or taxes. In the euro area, spending has become 
more procyclical while taxes have become more countercyclical. The same 
is true for the United States and Japan.11 Consistent with previous claims 
that procyclicality is driven by spending (Gavin and Perotti 1997; Tornell 
and Lane 1999), we ﬁ  nd that in most countries spending is procyclical. Only 
Finland and France have changed their policies toward more countercycli-
cality in the past ten years, as evidenced by the p-  value of the test for the 
equality of the coeﬃcients before and after 1999.
Tax revenues in some countries have also become or have remained pro-
cyclical. However for the euro area, Japan, U.K., and U.S. tax revenues 
signal countercyclical policy stance in recent years. The move is particularly 
pronounced in the case of the United States, where several expansionary tax 
11. For the United Kingdom, as in table 8.2, we see a large change toward countercyclical-
ity in both taxes and spending. But the large coeﬃcients and standard errors, together with 
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packages introduced in the beginning of the 2000s coincided (deliberately 
or not) with a negative output gap in the U.S. economy. From tables 8.3 and 
8.4 we can conclude that the increase in countercyclicality in the United 
States over the past ten years is coming from the revenue side rather than 
from the spending side.
It is also possible that the changes in the reaction of cyclically- adjusted tax 
receipts over the past ten years in some countries signal that the elasticities 
used in adjusting budgetary variables have changed. Indeed, recently the 
European Commission has started paying special attention to time varying 
elasticities, as documented in European Economy (2007).
8.3.5    Automatic  Stabilizers
We now look at the automatic stabilizers component of ﬁ  scal policy. In 
table 8.5 we rerun the previous regression by using as dependent variable 
the component of ﬁ  scal policy that is linked to automatic stabilizers. This 
is measured as the diﬀerence between the actual and the cyclically-  adjusted 
budget deﬁ  cit. The regressions are estimated by OLS as they recover the 
log- linear relationship between the gap and automatic stabilizers used by the 
OECD in the process of adjusting budget to automatic changes in revenues 
and spending. This exercise produces very diﬀerent results. First of all, the 
coeﬃcient on the cycle now becomes clearly signiﬁ  cant, as one would expect. 
In addition, the coeﬃcients for the euro area now show clearly the countercy-
clical nature of ﬁ  scal policy. When comparing the euro area with the United 
States, we see that the size of the coeﬃcient, in absolute value, is higher for 
the euro area. One potential reading of this comparison is that European 
countries have stronger automatic stabilizers built in and they have less need 
to use countercyclical discretionary measures. This is consistent with the fact 
that European governments have larger governments and that the size of 
governments have been associated to the signiﬁ  cance of automatic stabiliz-
ers. (Galí 1994; Fatás and Mihov 2001).
The coeﬃcients on the gap are closely related to the elasticities used by the 
OECD to derive the cyclically- adjusted budget balance. The OLS regression 
should uncover the weighted average of all elasticities (direct taxes, indirect 
taxes, social security payments, etc.) with the weights being given by the 
signiﬁ  cance of each category in the overall budget. Since the OECD uses 
time-  invariant elasticities, there is no point in searching for time-  variation 
in these coeﬃcients. The R2 also shows that the errors in this estimation are 
quite small, which implies that indeed this manipulation uncovers relatively 
well a weighted-  average estimate of the tax and spending elasticities used 
by the OECD.
The results at the national level conﬁ  rm the ones for the euro area. 
Coeﬃcients are positive and highly signiﬁ  cant. Coeﬃcients in the euro area 
vary from a low 0.3 (Greece) to a high of 0.65 (Germany), while in the 
United States and the United Kingdom these coeﬃcients are 0.29 and 0.39, 310        Antonio Fatás and Ilian Mihov
 respectively. Thus, in the euro area the increase of the gap by 1 percent gener-
ates a budget surplus of about 0.46 percent, while in the United States, the 
surplus goes up only by 0.29 percent.
One question that emerges from this discussion is whether automatic 
stabilizers lead to lower output volatility. In ﬁ  gure 8.5 we use the elastic-
ities reported in table 8.5 and we plot them against output volatility (in 
logarithm). The correlation is quite clear—countries like Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Belgium, with high elasticity of the budget with respect 
to the output gap, exhibit low levels of output volatility. The relationship 
between elasticities and volatility is statistically signiﬁ  cant, with a slope 
estimate of –  3.3. This implies that an increase in elasticity by 0.1 leads to a 
reduction in output volatility by about 30 percent. As we mentioned before, 
there is no time variation in these elasticities as they assumed to be constant 
in the construction of the cyclically-  adjusted balance. At the same time 
recent research has shown that the empirical relationship between gov-
Table 8.5  Automatic stabilizers (OLS estimates)
Gap Constant
    Coeﬃcient   s.e.   Coeﬃcient   s.e.   R2
EURO area 12 countries 0.464 (0.005)∗∗∗ 0.021 (0.009)∗∗ 1.00
Japan 0.267 (0.012)∗∗∗ –0.014 (0.021) 0.95
United Kingdom 0.391 (0.021)∗∗∗ –0.011 (0.033) 0.94
United States 0.293 (0.013)∗∗∗ 0.000 (0.020) 0.95
Austria 0.430 (0.015)∗∗∗ 0.011 (0.034) 0.95
Belgium 0.582 (0.046)∗∗∗ 0.042 (0.082) 0.83
Finland 0.460 (0.010)∗∗∗ –0.194 (0.046)∗∗∗ 0.98
France 0.439 (0.016)∗∗∗ 0.001 (0.028) 0.94
Germany 0.647 (0.062)∗∗∗ 0.334 (0.094)∗∗∗ 0.82
Greece 0.307 (0.019)∗∗∗ 0.012 (0.020) 0.94
Ireland 0.410 (0.012)∗∗∗ –0.010 (0.033) 0.98
Italy 0.378 (0.019)∗∗∗ –0.071 (0.032)∗∗ 0.93
Luxembourg 0.423 (0.026)∗∗∗ 0.013 (0.061) 0.96
Netherlands 0.534 (0.036)∗∗∗ –0.015 (0.068) 0.88
Portugal 0.333 (0.010)∗∗∗ 0.077 (0.036)∗∗ 0.98
Spain 0.422 (0.013)∗∗∗ –0.023 (0.044) 0.97
Denmark 0.503 (0.034)∗∗∗ 0.016 (0.064) 0.85
Sweden 0.522 (0.022)∗∗∗ –0.108 (0.044)∗∗ 0.96
Australia 0.339 (0.017)∗∗∗ –0.008 (0.025) 0.91
Canada 0.370 (0.013)∗∗∗ –0.055 (0.021)∗∗ 0.97
New Zealand 0.417 (0.007)∗∗∗ 0.047 (0.015)∗∗∗ 0.99
Norway 1.518 (0.268)∗∗∗ 11.656 (1.194)∗∗∗ 0.57
Switzerland   0.392   (0.014)∗∗∗   –0.197   (0.035)∗∗∗  0.98
Note: Robust standard errors (s.e.) in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.The Euro and Fiscal Policy    3 1 1
ernment size and the volatility of GDP seems to have become weaker (as 
documented in Debrun, Pisany-  Ferry, and Sapir [2008]). The fact that the 
relationship has become weaker is an indication that there have been changes 
in the eﬀectiveness of automatic stabilizers that have also weakened the 
link between the size of the government and their smoothing eﬀect. Given 
that the close link between government size and automatic stabilizers, it 
seems important to review the assumption of time-  invariant elasticities. 
If one ﬁ  nds that elasticities have changed, then researchers will be able to 
construct better measures of the structural balance. If, on the other hand, 
it turns out that elasticities have not changed, then the link between govern-
ment size and stabilization has become indeed weaker, which will lead to 
review of the desirability of having large governments. Larger governments, 
as much as they might be able to provide a cushion to business cycle ﬂ  uctua-
tions, can be associated with crowding out and lower growth.
8.3.6      The Use of (Exogenous) Discretionary Fiscal Policy
To establish whether exogenous discretionary policy has become more 
aggressive since 1999, we calculate the volatility of the residuals from equa-
tion (1). Table 8.6 compares the volatility of discretionary policy before and 
after EMU as well as with the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan. 
We show volatilities calculated using a ﬁ  scal policy rule with a break in 1999. 
What is evident from the previous numbers is that the euro area has the 
lowest standard deviation of the residual, so the size and frequency of ﬁ  s-
cal policy exogenous “shocks” is much smaller than for the other countries. 
Fig. 8.5    Output volatility and automatic stabilizers312        Antonio Fatás and Ilian Mihov
We also see a decrease in the volatility over time. The fact that the volatil-
ity is lower for the euro area should not be a surprise as this is an aggre-
gate of national ﬁ  scal policies and it is diﬃcult to think about coordinated 
changes in ﬁ  scal policy. It might be that we observe such changes of poli-
cies at the national level but they are not synchronized and therefore vanish 
when we aggregate all the countries. However, and as we have seen in the pre-
vious section, we do observe some signiﬁ  cant changes in ﬁ  scal policy at the 
euro level. So one potential reading of these results is that European coun-
tries are less willing to engage in discretionary changes in ﬁ  scal policy. It is 
possible that this decline in aggressiveness is due to the increased monitor-
ing of national ﬁ  scal policies by the European Commission. On the margin, 
changing ﬁ  scal stance for reasons unrelated to the state of cycle has become 
more diﬃcult, as any change is carefully scrutinized by the Commission. 
Potentially this is only a partial explanation, as the volatility in the United 
States has declined even faster than in the euro area.
When we look at individual countries, most euro countries display low 
volatility of exogenous discretionary policy, which is consistent with what 
we found for the aggregate of the euro countries. We also see that this 
volatility has decreased in the second half of the sample for all countries 
with the exception of Austria, Ireland, and Luxembourg. Outside of the 
Table 8.6  Volatility of the residuals
  Country   Before 1999  After 1999 
EURO area 12 countries 0.304 0.146
Japan 1.096 2.543
United Kingdom 1.845 0.899

















New Zealand 0.109 0.281
Norway 1.466 1.399
  Switzerland   0.219   0.308  The Euro and Fiscal Policy    3 1 3
EU-  15, only Canada and the United States show substantial reduction in 
policy volatility.
8.4      Does Fiscal Policy React to Output Growth or to the Output Gap?
Both in the construction of the cyclically-  adjusted balance, as well as in 
the estimation previously reported, there is an assumption that ﬁ  scal policy 
reacts to the output gap. There are two issues: ﬁ  rst, the reported gap might 
be a noisy and biased estimate of the actual gap. Second, ﬁ  scal authorities 
might be more concerned with growth rather than the gap.
We can illustrate the diﬃculty in interpreting regression results by redo-
ing ﬁ  gures 8.3 and 8.4 (euro area and U.S. correlation between cyclically-
  adjusted balances and the cycle) by using the output growth rate instead of 
the gap as a measure of the cyclical position of the economy. Figures 8.6 
and 8.7 plot the change in the structural balance against real growth for the 
euro area and the United States. It is interesting that while for the United 
States the picture looks very similar to the previous plot, for the euro area 
we now see a much less clear picture. While the years 2000 and 2001 show 
procyclical ﬁ  scal policy, in the years that follow 2002 through 2007 we see 
a positive slope, signaling acyclical or countercyclical policy. This is very 
diﬀerent from what we saw in ﬁ  gure 8.3, using the output gap, where euro 
ﬁ  scal policy was clearly procyclical.
The comparison between ﬁ  gure 8.3 and ﬁ  gure 8.6 opens the door for a 
diﬀerent interpretation of our results. There is still no doubt that U.S. ﬁ  scal 
policy is more countercyclical (and in a consistent manner) than the euro 
one. But whether the euro ﬁ  scal policy has been countercyclical or procycli-
cal (or has switched from one to the other) remains an open question. The 
European Commission uses the output gap as the cyclical indicator to assess 
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the stance of ﬁ  scal policy, but it might be that politicians care more about 
growth and react to the output growth rate. 
There is even a deeper issue: current practice in removing the cyclical com-
ponent of the budget balance uses as a starting point the automatic reaction 
of ﬁ  scal variables to the output gap. That is the case for the measures we have 
used in this chapter and produced by the OECD or the structural balance 
used by the European Commission. What if in fact tax revenues react more 
closely to the growth rate of output rather than to the gap? If this is the case, 
then many of the results in the literature have to be reinterpreted. To evaluate 
this possibility, we run a “race” between the gap and output growth. In table 
8.7 our dependent variable is the primary balance as percent of GDP, while 
the key regressors are the growth rate of real GDP and the output gap.
The results are quite interesting. With the exception of Denmark and 
Sweden, in all countries where we have signiﬁ  cant coeﬃcients the key vari-
able is output growth and not the output gap. Importantly, in the euro area 
the gap enters with a negative, albeit insigniﬁ  cant, coeﬃcient (implying pro-
cyclicality), while the growth rate enters with a signiﬁ  cant positive coeﬃcient 
(countercyclicality). The estimates imply that the primary balance—which 
includes both automatic stabilizers and structural balances—reacts more 
readily to output growth rather than to the output gap. At this point, the 
only thing that we can do is to raise a warning ﬂ  ag. To reestimate the results 
in the previous tables we need ﬁ  rst to decompose the balance into cycli-
cal and structural components by using elasticities with respect to output 
growth and not the output gap. Furthermore, it is quite conceivable that 
certain ﬁ  scal variables respond to the gap (e.g., unemployment beneﬁ  ts), 
while others respond to the growth rate (tax revenues). And although this 
task lies beyond the scope of the chapter, table 8.7 is still useful in both 
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raising the issue and in pointing out that the disparity of ﬁ  ndings in the 
literature might be due to the diﬀerence in the cyclical indicator used to 
evaluate the behavior of ﬁ  scal policy. It is certainly worth considering 
in future work an alternative adjustment based on the growth rate. See 
Blanchard (1993) for an in-  depth discussion of the alternative adjustment 
methods.
8.5      Coordination of National Fiscal Policies: 
Is There a Euro-  Wide Fiscal Policy Stance?
In the previous sections of the chapter we looked both at the behavior of 
ﬁ  scal policy for the aggregate of the twelve euro countries as well as for each 
of the countries. Although there is no government behind the behavior of 
the euro aggregate, it is simply the collection of twelve individual policies; 
these individual policies have been designed within the institutional frame-
work of the Maastricht treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact so the idea 
of Euro-  wide ﬁ  scal policy is not entirely meaningless. The framework has 
possibly introduced some commonalities across national ﬁ  scal policies. For 
example, the run- up to the euro launch led to ﬁ  scal consolidation eﬀorts for 
many of the governments. In addition, the interpretation and implementa-
tion of the Stability and Growth Pact has led to increasing emphasis on 
coordination of national ﬁ  scal policies. This coordination of national ﬁ  scal 
policies runs contrary to the intuition that with a common monetary policy, 
ﬁ  scal policy should behave in an even less coordinated fashion as it needs to 
deal with idiosyncratic national shocks. In this section we look at national 
ﬁ  scal policies and ask the question of whether we have seen any move toward 
coordination or synchronization. Figure 8.8 plots the annual standard de-
viation of the structural budget balance across euro countries and compares 
it to the same measure for the non- euro countries in the sample.12 Since 1999, 
there is a clear trend toward less dispersion among the euro countries that 
is not evident for the rest of the countries. This trend can be the result of 
proactive coordination but it could also be the outcome of some countries 
being close or above the limits established for budget deﬁ  cits.
The trend toward more similar structural balances might be a result also 
of synchronization of business cycles. Indeed, ﬁ  gure 8.9 shows that the dis-
persion of the output gap has been declining steadily since the early 1990s. 
Interestingly, however, this trend is visible both for the euro area and for the 
group of the non-  euro area countries. If we compare now ﬁ  gures 8.8 and 
8.9, it seems that there is more to the synchronization of ﬁ  scal policy stances 
across euro countries than just synchronization of business cycles.
Finally, ﬁ  gure 8.10 reports synchronization of ﬁ  scal policy by looking 
12. Norway is excluded from this calculation because of the high volatility of the budget 
stemming from ﬂ  uctuations in oil prices.Fig. 8.8    Dispersion of cyclically-  adjusted budget balances
Note: Standard deviation across countries in percent.
Fig. 8.9    Dispersion of output gaps
Note: Standard deviation across countries in percent.318        Antonio Fatás and Ilian Mihov
at the exogenous component. We measure the dispersion (using standard 
deviation) of the residuals from equation (1) across both euro and non- euro 
countries. In this case we see that there is a very small downward trend for 
both samples. We already know that the typical size of these shocks has 
decreased over the sample period, so this could simply be due to the fact that 
we see fewer and smaller changes in discretionary ﬁ  scal policy and, therefore, 
an increase in synchronization for many countries. Of course, this need not 
be the case, as it is possible that many large and coordinated changes in ﬁ  scal 
policy lead to a small cross-  country standard deviation.
8.6    Concluding  Remarks
The 1992 Maastricht treaty recognized the importance of providing a 
framework for ﬁ  scal policy in EMU and established limits to deﬁ  cits and 
debt in order to “avoid excessive government deﬁ  cits” (Article 104). At the 
same time it deﬁ  ned an Excessive Deﬁ  cit Procedure in case of violations. The 
Stability and Growth Pact (1997) developed the original ideas of the Maas-
tricht treaty into a set of more detailed rules and processes to ensure budget 
discipline and enforcement. The principles of the Stability and Growth pact 
were later amended by a report of the ECOFIN council in March 2005 that 
was later endorsed by the European Council.
This is the environment under which ﬁ  scal policy has been conducted 
in the euro area, an environment that has been a source of criticisms and 
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debates. Some have seen these limits as unnecessary constraints on national 
ﬁ  scal policy at a time when it was needed the most, with negative conse-
quences on the macroeconomic performance of these economies. For those 
who had to implement the constraints and procedures (European Commis-
sion) or those who were supposed to care about them (ECB), the rules have 
not provided an easily enforceable system and the outcome has been far from 
what the system was designed for. Fiscal consolidation has not been large 
enough and national policies have continued to display many of the prior 
biases (such as procyclicality).
In this chapter we have provided a characterization of ﬁ  scal policy at the 
euro and the national levels and used countries outside of the euro area as 
benchmark. Our goal was not to propose an alternative ﬁ  scal policy frame-
work but more to validate or disprove the conventional wisdom about how 
ﬁ  scal policy has behaved and the extent to which the EMU ﬁ  scal policy 
framework has aﬀected that behavior.
Overall, our results have shown that the behavior of ﬁ  scal policy in the 
euro area has not been too diﬀerent from what we have seen in other coun-
tries and that the introduction of the euro has not led to a signiﬁ  cant change. 
The fear that ﬁ  scal policy would become less disciplined because govern-
ments would not internalize the cost of “bad” ﬁ  scal policy in the absence 
of national currencies is not validated by our results. There is also very little 
evidence that the ﬁ  scal policy stance at the national level has gotten worse. 
Although cyclically-  adjusted balances still show some tendency to be pro-
cyclical for some countries in the euro zone, it is still true that the automatic 
stabilizers do most of the countercyclical adjustment in the union. The other 
positive reading of our results is that governments have not abused their 
discretion and that the size of frequency of politically motivated ﬁ  scal policy 
changes has decreased among the European economies.
Coordination of ﬁ  scal policies has received much recent attention by the 
European Commission as a way to justify the strong surveillance mecha-
nisms that they impose on national countries. The notion of coordination 
is sometimes linked to that of economic convergence but this link is theo-
retically not founded, as we should expect the opposite: as countries have 
abandoned monetary policy, there is a stronger need to rely on ﬁ  scal policy 
as an automatic stabilizer. Of course, if business cycles become more syn-
chronized, we will see coordination but there is no need to impose that 
coordination as one lets automatic stabilizers run their course. This is indeed 
what our results show. But it also seems that there is something beyond 
business cycle synchronization since a similar decline in dispersion for the 
countries outside the euro zone has not been met with a decline in the dis-
persion of their structural balances. Other measures of ﬁ  scal policy, those 
that also include the discretionary component, do not show any tendency to 
become less coordinated. If any, there seems to be more coordination and 
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not taken advantage of the euro ﬁ  scal framework to push diﬀerent political 
agendas through the use of ﬁ  scal policy.
Our analysis of the euro- wide aggregates provided us with the perspective 
that the ECB and monetary policy have about ﬁ  scal policy. In some sense, it 
could be argued that this is the relevant dimension in which to discuss ﬁ  scal 
policy in the euro area. As much as national ﬁ  scal policies can show biases 
and behaviors that are not optimal, when it comes to monetary policy and 
the currency, what matters is the behavior of ﬁ  scal policy at the aggregate 
level (of course, the aggregate is made out of the sum of all the national ﬁ  scal 
policies, so their understanding can still provide very useful insights).
When looking at the euro-  wide ﬁ  scal policy we see a behavior that is 
diﬀerent from what we have seen in the United States. Fiscal policy is more 
procyclical in the euro area than in the United States (where it is strongly 
countercyclical), but it is also true that the automatic stabilizers are larger in 
the euro zone. In addition, and this should be welcomed by the ECB, ﬁ  scal 
policy is less volatile at the euro level when it comes to exogenous changes, 
those that are not motivated by the economic environment.
Last but not least, it is important to emphasize that many of the ﬁ  ndings 
in the literature are sensitive to the cyclical indicator used in the regres-
sion analysis. In this chapter we show that the primary balance reacts more 
readily to the growth rate of real output rather than to the output gap. 
Reassessing the construction of cyclically-  adjusted variables might lead to 
signiﬁ  cant changes in the way that researchers view ﬁ  scal policy stance in 
the OECD economies.
Appendix
Table 8A.1  Fiscal policy reaction function
Gap Debt (t – 1) Primary balance (t – 1)
    Coeﬃcient   s.e.   Coeﬃcient   s.e.   Coeﬃcient   s.e.
A. Dependent variable: Primary balance (IV estimates, no break)
EURO area 12 countries –0.006 (0.103) 0.020 (0.011) 0.657 (0.143)∗∗∗
Japan –0.004 (0.145) 0.005 (0.007) 0.901 (0.082)∗∗∗
United Kingdom 0.041 (0.143) –0.003 (0.030) 0.728 (0.110)∗∗∗
United States 0.099 (0.141) 0.038 (0.018)∗∗ 0.695 (0.118)∗∗∗
Austria 0.316 (0.109)∗∗∗ 0.027 (0.013)∗∗ 0.481 (0.133)∗∗∗
Belgium –0.048 (0.249) 0.035 (0.013)∗∗ 0.756 (0.126)∗∗∗
Finland 0.285 (0.213) 0.037 (0.018)∗∗ 0.676 (0.173)∗∗∗
France 0.083 (0.162) 0.011 (0.007) 0.577 (0.203)∗∗∗
Germany 0.025 (0.128) 0.021 (0.016) 0.570 (0.119)∗∗∗
Greece –0.436 (0.466) 0.022 (0.012) 0.604 (0.148)∗∗∗Ireland –0.242 (0.210) 0.005 (0.014) 0.910 (0.058)∗∗∗
Italy –0.123 (0.117) 0.065 (0.014)∗∗∗ 0.493 (0.096)∗∗∗
Luxembourg 0.427 (0.194) 1.009 (0.473) 0.266 (0.207)
Netherlands –0.070 (0.261) 0.017 (0.020) 0.793 (0.228)∗∗∗
Portugal –0.010 (0.090) 0.068 (0.036) 0.442 (0.151)∗∗∗
Spain 0.015 (0.100) 0.036 (0.012)∗∗∗ 0.841 (0.102)∗∗∗
Denmark 1.016 (0.298)∗∗∗ 0.047 (0.008)∗∗∗ 0.579 (0.086)∗∗∗
Sweden 1.217 (0.434)∗∗∗ 0.051 (0.016)∗∗∗ 0.474 (0.188)∗∗
Australia 0.309 (0.239) 0.058 (0.019)∗∗∗ 0.745 (0.105)∗∗∗
Canada 0.339 (0.107)∗∗∗ 0.062 (0.014)∗∗∗ 0.653 (0.078)∗∗∗
New Zealand 1.022 (0.390)∗∗ –0.001 (0.024) 0.201 (0.237)
Norway –0.002 (0.284) 0.129 (0.082) 0.743 (0.149)∗∗∗
Switzerland 0.396 (0.163)∗∗ 0.115 (0.018)∗∗∗ 0.318 (0.160)
B. Dependent variable: Primary balance (OLS estimates, no break)
EURO area 12 countries 0.156 (0.105) 0.025 (0.011)∗∗ 0.545 (0.145)∗∗∗
Japan 0.086 (0.104) 0.005 (0.007) 0.883 (0.079)∗∗∗
United Kingdom 0.074 (0.132) –0.002 (0.024) 0.726 (0.083)∗∗∗
United States 0.342 (0.082)∗∗∗ 0.033 (0.016) 0.650 (0.107)∗∗∗
Austria 0.265 (0.094)∗∗∗ 0.025 (0.012)∗∗ 0.506 (0.130)∗∗∗
Belgium 0.100 (0.127) 0.042 (0.011)∗∗∗ 0.725 (0.111)∗∗∗
Finland 0.498 (0.141)∗∗∗ 0.027 (0.017) 0.533 (0.114)∗∗∗
France 0.177 (0.105) 0.011 (0.007) 0.532 (0.144)∗∗∗
Germany 0.092 (0.130) 0.024 (0.016) 0.540 (0.119)∗∗∗
Greece –0.194 (0.199) 0.025 (0.012)∗∗ 0.612 (0.124)∗∗∗
Ireland –0.112 (0.121) 0.013 (0.013) 0.923 (0.064)∗∗∗
Italy 0.084 (0.114) 0.069 (0.014)∗∗∗ 0.491 (0.098)∗∗∗
Luxembourg 0.328 (0.168) 0.999 (0.458) 0.321 (0.214)
Netherlands 0.206 (0.236) 0.019 (0.020) 0.599 (0.219)∗∗
Portugal 0.042 (0.072) 0.085 (0.028)∗∗∗ 0.402 (0.142)∗∗∗
Spain 0.071 (0.095) 0.032 (0.011)∗∗∗ 0.815 (0.103)∗∗∗
Denmark 0.903 (0.128)∗∗∗ 0.041 (0.009)∗∗∗ 0.618 (0.083)∗∗∗
Sweden 1.096 (0.260)∗∗∗ 0.051 (0.016)∗∗∗ 0.517 (0.119)∗∗∗
Australia 0.383 (0.139)∗∗ 0.057 (0.020)∗∗∗ 0.720 (0.090)∗∗∗
Canada 0.360 (0.094)∗∗∗ 0.063 (0.013)∗∗∗ 0.646 (0.073)∗∗∗
New Zealand 0.741 (0.100)∗∗∗ –0.005 (0.021) 0.339 (0.181)
Norway 0.162 (0.202) 0.100 (0.073) 0.704 (0.128)∗∗∗
Switzerland   0.304   (0.132)∗∗   0.108   (0.015)∗∗∗   0.386   (0.150)∗∗
Note: Robust standard errors (s.e.) in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
Table 8A.1  (continued)
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Comment  Roberto Perotti
This is an interesting and well-  written chapter that presents a useful over-
view of ﬁ  scal policy issues and some interesting results. In these comments 
I will focus on what I regard as the two most important empirical questions 
studied in the chapter: (a) is ﬁ  scal policy more or less countercyclical in 
Europe than in the United States? and (b) has the euro plus the Growth and 
Stability Pact induced a more procyclical (less countercyclical) behavior of 
ﬁ  scal policy in European Monetary Union (EMU) countries?
On the ﬁ  rst issue, the answer of the chapter is clear, and conﬁ  rms both 
existing empirical results and common wisdom on the diﬀerence between 
Europe and the United States: “discretionary” ﬁ  scal policy seems more 
countercyclical in the United States, “automatic stabilizers” more counter-
cyclical in Europe. The authors present convincing empirical evidence on 
this eﬀect, and support it with equally convincing robustness analysis. I do 
not have much to add on this point.
On the second issue, obviously it is hard to base any conclusion on less 
than ten years of data, but even leaving this problem aside, I think the ver-
dict is still open, and hard to reach. As the authors point out in section 8.4, 
following the discussion at the conference, the problem is well illustrated by 
a comparison of ﬁ  gures 8.3 and 8.6: while discretionary ﬁ  scal policy in the 
euro area seems procyclical if evaluated against the output gap, it appears 
countercyclical if evaluated against the growth rate of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP).
Note that this issue in turn involves two fundamentally diﬀerent under-
lying issues. The ﬁ  rst is, what is the appropriate variable to cyclically adjust 
the budget? Suppose that a certain expenditure item changes automati-
cally, by law, in response to the output gap; then the appropriate variable 
to   cyclically adjust this expenditure item is the output gap. Similarly, the 
appropriate variable is output growth if by law an expenditure or revenue 
item moves with the change in the level of output. In reality, things are even 
more complex, because the reference level for cyclical adjustment (potential 
output or last year’s output) is not deﬁ  ned by law.
But even assuming we have taken a stance on the appropriate reference 
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